Ten years... and still counting
The IAF might be crying for fighters but the MoD has no sense of urgency
by M K SHUKLA and VINCENT VAN ROSS
THE Panipat syndrome runs deep in the psyche of the Indian political class and its cronies. Even though India’s neighbourhood is packed with elements threatening to drop nasty garbage on our head, the defence procurement policy has no sense of alarm nor is there any urgency to build a modern military-industrial complex on our own.
Take the case of the Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). Ten years after India sent out the Request for Information (RFI) in 2001 for purchase of 126+ MMRCA, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced this April that two aircraft, the Eurofighter and Dassault’s Rafale, have been shortlisted. India’s planned multibillion-dollar purchase of 126+ fighters had led to a contest between France’s Dassault, Sweden’s Saab, Russia’s MiG, EADS’ Eurofighter and American manufacturers.
Amid all the vendors/contractors and the MoD, it became a game of patience. A Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued six years after the RFI, even as India’s existing fighter fleet continued to wear out, and China’s and Pakistan’s fleets continued to grow. It has taken four years since to shortlist the vendors. That too because the IAF put its foot down at the leisurely pace of the MoD.
The sanctioned strength of the Indian Air Force is 39.5 squadrons. However, 45 squadrons is considered a healthy level. With the acquisition of Mirage-2000s, MiG-29s and Jaguars in the 1980s, India reached this level.
But reduction in the number of aircraft due to retirement of obsolete aircraft, and air crash and attrition losses depleted the active force levels to 34 squadrons. Depletion to 32 squadrons took place following further phasing out of aircraft. If corrective measures are not taken immediately, the strength of active IAF squadrons may dip to 27 in the next five years.
Originally, the indigenously built Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Tejas, developed by DRDO, was to replace the ageing MiG-21 fleet. With the Kaveri jet engine failing to come up to expectations, the Tejas project was stalled. Tejas is a Light Combat Aircraft and its price is around $25 million per plane. The final tests on Tejas were conducted this January and, if all goes well, the aircraft should be operational by the end of 2012.
The original objective behind the fighter purchase was to find aircraft that would fit between India’s high-end Su-30 MKIs and its low-end Tejas lightweight combat aircraft. While plans to develop a “fifth generation fighter” in collaboration with Russia have been there for years, they are uncertain at best, address a different requirement, and offer no solution to the immediate problem of shrinking squadron numbers.
The RFP announcement in mid-2007 estimated the cost of 126 MMRCA at Rs 42,000 crore (about $10.24 billion or about $81.3 million per fighter). The 211-page document included clauses for initial purchase, transfer of technology, licensed production, and life-time maintenance support for the aircraft. Under the terms of purchase, the first 18 aircraft would come in fly away condition, while the remaining 108 would be manufactured under transfer of technology. Some reports added an option for an additional 63-64 aircraft on the same terms, bringing the potential total to 190 aircraft.
The vendor who finally wins will be required to undertake 50% offset obligations in India. That’s a boost from the usual 30%, which is required for Indian defence purchases over $70 million. The additional 20% was added because India is looking for a large boost to its aerospace and defence electronics industries, and understands that the size of their purchase gives them additional leverage.
Also, politically, it has become too risky to take bribes from foreign vendors following the Bofors and HDW scandals; and so Indian companies are being propped up, according to some political sources, to take the place of foreign vendors for political and personal contributions.
It may be recalled that Defence Minister AK Antony, while chairing the Defence Acquisition Council Meeting on June 29, 2007, had outlined three guiding principles for this procurement scheme. First, the operational requirements of the IAF should be fully met.
Second, the selection process should be competitive, fair and transparent, so that best value for money is realized. Lastly, Indian defence industries should get an opportunity to grow to global scales. Time will tell if the objectives of the MoD’s RFP are met, or if a process of waiting almost six years for an RFP, and then years more for a winner, is only the beginning of the process. It is not clear as yet what the Contract Negotiating Committee (CNC) has negotiated on offsets with the shortlisted vendors in particular, and the loser competitors in general.
At the moment, there is no murmur. Because all the four “losers” have other things to look forward to. Boeing is negotiating on the C-17 Globemaster III and Orion; Lockheed is negotiating for additional C-130J Super Hercules; Saab is negotiating for defence electronics; and the Russians are negotiating for a range of things.
Rafale (Dassault, France)
The Rafale offers good aerodynamic performance, has exceptional ordnance capacity for its size, and can have its range extended via conformal fuel tanks. Dassault claims Mach 1+ “supercruise” capability without afterburners, but observers are sceptical. The Rafale’s weaknesses include the continuing absence of a compatible surveillance and advanced targeting pod, the need for additional funds and work to integrate many non-French weapons if one wishes to use them on the Rafale, and its lack of an AESA radar until Thales finishes developing the RBE2-AA.
Eurofighter (EADS, BAE) A fourth generation aircraft currently optimized for the air-air role through its performance characteristics, and what is by all accounts an excellent pilot interface. Some observers believe that, aside from the F-22A Raptor, the Eurofighter is the next best in-service air superiority aircraft worldwide, though the 2007 Indra Dhanush exercise that matched it against India’s Su-MK1 makes a case for Sukhoi’s fighter.
India’s delay has given the fighter more time to mature, and upgrades and new weapon options are giving current production versions full multi-role capabilities. Eurofighters reportedly have “supercruise” capability, though it probably is not sustainable once the fighter is armed. Eurofighter GmbH even unveiled a proposed naval variant at Aero India 2011, which it claims could launch without catapults from the “ski-jump” decks on India’s future carriers.
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet (Boeing, US)
Highly upgraded version of the F/A-18 AD Hornet, enlarged and given new engines and avionics. Commonality between the Hornet and Super Hornet is only about 25%. Strengths include its powerful AN/APG-79 AESA radar, which has drawn significant interest from India. This radar could allow Super Hornets to play a unique role in India’s fighter fleet as versatile “quarterbacks” (or better yet, “cricket captains”) due to their radar’s performance and information sharing abilities. Other advantages include carrier capability, a very wide range of integrated weapons, a design that is proven in service and in combat, F414 engines that may also serve as the base for LCA Tejas Mk2; and complete assurance in its future upgrade spiral, given the US Navy’s commitment to it.
Weaknesses of the Super Hornet platform included deep distrust of America’s reliability as an arms supplier, technology transfer concerns, and the aircraft’s expense. Given the costs to other customers so far, it seems unlikely that Boeing can deliver 126 fully-equipped F/A-18 E/F Block II aircraft for just $10.2 billion, let alone aircraft plus lifetime support. The Super Hornet also offers poorer aerodynamic performance than the Eurofighter or Rafale, due to inherent airframe limitations. Finally, it’s a new aircraft type for the IAF, so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed from the ground up.
F-16 Fighting Falcon (Lockheed Martin, US)
Lockheed’s “Block 70” offering would have been a modified version of the F-16E Block 60 “Desert Falcon”, currently serving with the UAE. Strengths include the widest multi-role capability among lightweight fighters; its proven AN/APG-80 AESA radar; the addition of integrated IRST (Infra Red Search & Track) capability; the widest choice of proven avionics and weapon systems; a long record of proven service so all issues are known; and widespread compatibility with potential allies in Asia and the Middle East who also fly F-16s. The combination of an AESA radar on a less expensive platform is also good news for cruise missile defence efforts, if that’s considered a priority.
Weaknesses include the fact that Pakistan also flies F-16s; the fact it’s a new aircraft type, so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; and Lockheed Martin’s difficulty in complying with industrial offset provisions, given their lack of penetration in India. The MMRCA RFP’s delays may have helped Lockheed, by allowing them ample time to find arrangements with Indian firms. There are also reports that the US government was pushing this option, because of the regional reassurance factor. While an F-16 E/F Block 60+ would have a number of important advantages over Pakistan’s F-16 A/Bs and even its new Block 50/52 aircraft, the common underlying aircraft type would probably take some of the edge off the deal from Pakistan’s point of view.
MiG-29OVT, became the MiG-35 (Roson boron export, Russia)
This modified MiG-29 includes improved radar and avionics that give it multi-role capability, extra fuel in a new aircraft “spine,” and thrust-vectoring engines a la India’s Su-30 MKIs. While the MiG-29 has traditionally been considered a lightweight fighter, the combined effect of these changes pushes the MiG-29 toward the mid range.
Its strengths include compatibility with India’s existing and future MiG-29 fleet, and its ability to carry advanced Russian missiles already in service: the revolutionary AA-11/R-73 Archer and longer range AA-12/R-77 “AMRAAMski.” The presence of MiG-29-related manufacturing and maintenance, including a new plant for licence-building RD-33 Series III engines in India, would make compliance with industrial offset requirements easier.
The MiG-29’s biggest weaknesses are short range, engines that produce telltale smoke (very bad in air combat) and lack of true multi-role capability. The MiG-35 largely fixes these issues, and may even add an AESA radar of its own if Phazotron-NIIR can have its new Zhuk-AE ready in time. Remaining weaknesses in the MiG-35 bid include the serious difficulties India has had with Russian firms over the refit of its new carrier, order for more Mi-17 helicopters, and order for three more Krivak-III class frigates. All have featured failure to deliver, and post-contract price renegotiation demands that have raised prices up 200%. Reports that MiG-35 delivery cannot start before 2014 at the earliest add a further disadvantage, especially compared to competitors with active production lines and rapid delivery capability.
JAS-39 Gripen (Saab, Sweden)
The Gripen is a true 4th+ generation lightweight fighter and significantly more capable than category competitors like the F-16 and Mirage 2000, though the MiG-35 may give it a run for its money. Gripen NG begins to address the aircraft’s range limitations, and would include an AESA radar among its other enhancements. Other strengths include a wide choice of integrated weapons and pods; reasonable purchase cost; the fact that it has been designed for exceptional cost of ownership; and the ability to operate from roads instead of runways if necessary. With respect to industrial offsets, Saab has made a strong offer, backed by excellent record in countries like South Africa, Hungary, the Czech Republic et al. As an interesting side note, the JAS- 39NG’s use of GE’s F414G engine would create future commonality with India’s own Tejas Mk2, which will also be powered by the F414 after DRDO’s Kaveri engine failure put the entire project in jeopardy.
The JAS-39’s drawbacks include its short range; the fact it’s a new aircraft type for the IAF; its AESA radar’s developmental status; perceived similarity (whether valid or not) to the Tejas fighter’s potential performance; and a low volume of international orders to date that raises questions about the platform’s ability to modernize over the next 30-40 years.
(With inputs from Defense Industry Daily)
The IAF might be crying for fighters but the MoD has no sense of urgency
by M K SHUKLA and VINCENT VAN ROSS
THE Panipat syndrome runs deep in the psyche of the Indian political class and its cronies. Even though India’s neighbourhood is packed with elements threatening to drop nasty garbage on our head, the defence procurement policy has no sense of alarm nor is there any urgency to build a modern military-industrial complex on our own.Take the case of the Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). Ten years after India sent out the Request for Information (RFI) in 2001 for purchase of 126+ MMRCA, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced this April that two aircraft, the Eurofighter and Dassault’s Rafale, have been shortlisted. India’s planned multibillion-dollar purchase of 126+ fighters had led to a contest between France’s Dassault, Sweden’s Saab, Russia’s MiG, EADS’ Eurofighter and American manufacturers.
Amid all the vendors/contractors and the MoD, it became a game of patience. A Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued six years after the RFI, even as India’s existing fighter fleet continued to wear out, and China’s and Pakistan’s fleets continued to grow. It has taken four years since to shortlist the vendors. That too because the IAF put its foot down at the leisurely pace of the MoD.
The sanctioned strength of the Indian Air Force is 39.5 squadrons. However, 45 squadrons is considered a healthy level. With the acquisition of Mirage-2000s, MiG-29s and Jaguars in the 1980s, India reached this level.
But reduction in the number of aircraft due to retirement of obsolete aircraft, and air crash and attrition losses depleted the active force levels to 34 squadrons. Depletion to 32 squadrons took place following further phasing out of aircraft. If corrective measures are not taken immediately, the strength of active IAF squadrons may dip to 27 in the next five years. Originally, the indigenously built Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Tejas, developed by DRDO, was to replace the ageing MiG-21 fleet. With the Kaveri jet engine failing to come up to expectations, the Tejas project was stalled. Tejas is a Light Combat Aircraft and its price is around $25 million per plane. The final tests on Tejas were conducted this January and, if all goes well, the aircraft should be operational by the end of 2012.
The original objective behind the fighter purchase was to find aircraft that would fit between India’s high-end Su-30 MKIs and its low-end Tejas lightweight combat aircraft. While plans to develop a “fifth generation fighter” in collaboration with Russia have been there for years, they are uncertain at best, address a different requirement, and offer no solution to the immediate problem of shrinking squadron numbers.
The RFP announcement in mid-2007 estimated the cost of 126 MMRCA at Rs 42,000 crore (about $10.24 billion or about $81.3 million per fighter). The 211-page document included clauses for initial purchase, transfer of technology, licensed production, and life-time maintenance support for the aircraft. Under the terms of purchase, the first 18 aircraft would come in fly away condition, while the remaining 108 would be manufactured under transfer of technology. Some reports added an option for an additional 63-64 aircraft on the same terms, bringing the potential total to 190 aircraft. The vendor who finally wins will be required to undertake 50% offset obligations in India. That’s a boost from the usual 30%, which is required for Indian defence purchases over $70 million. The additional 20% was added because India is looking for a large boost to its aerospace and defence electronics industries, and understands that the size of their purchase gives them additional leverage.
Also, politically, it has become too risky to take bribes from foreign vendors following the Bofors and HDW scandals; and so Indian companies are being propped up, according to some political sources, to take the place of foreign vendors for political and personal contributions.
It may be recalled that Defence Minister AK Antony, while chairing the Defence Acquisition Council Meeting on June 29, 2007, had outlined three guiding principles for this procurement scheme. First, the operational requirements of the IAF should be fully met.
Second, the selection process should be competitive, fair and transparent, so that best value for money is realized. Lastly, Indian defence industries should get an opportunity to grow to global scales. Time will tell if the objectives of the MoD’s RFP are met, or if a process of waiting almost six years for an RFP, and then years more for a winner, is only the beginning of the process. It is not clear as yet what the Contract Negotiating Committee (CNC) has negotiated on offsets with the shortlisted vendors in particular, and the loser competitors in general.
At the moment, there is no murmur. Because all the four “losers” have other things to look forward to. Boeing is negotiating on the C-17 Globemaster III and Orion; Lockheed is negotiating for additional C-130J Super Hercules; Saab is negotiating for defence electronics; and the Russians are negotiating for a range of things.
Rafale (Dassault, France)
The Rafale offers good aerodynamic performance, has exceptional ordnance capacity for its size, and can have its range extended via conformal fuel tanks. Dassault claims Mach 1+ “supercruise” capability without afterburners, but observers are sceptical. The Rafale’s weaknesses include the continuing absence of a compatible surveillance and advanced targeting pod, the need for additional funds and work to integrate many non-French weapons if one wishes to use them on the Rafale, and its lack of an AESA radar until Thales finishes developing the RBE2-AA.
Eurofighter (EADS, BAE) A fourth generation aircraft currently optimized for the air-air role through its performance characteristics, and what is by all accounts an excellent pilot interface. Some observers believe that, aside from the F-22A Raptor, the Eurofighter is the next best in-service air superiority aircraft worldwide, though the 2007 Indra Dhanush exercise that matched it against India’s Su-MK1 makes a case for Sukhoi’s fighter.
India’s delay has given the fighter more time to mature, and upgrades and new weapon options are giving current production versions full multi-role capabilities. Eurofighters reportedly have “supercruise” capability, though it probably is not sustainable once the fighter is armed. Eurofighter GmbH even unveiled a proposed naval variant at Aero India 2011, which it claims could launch without catapults from the “ski-jump” decks on India’s future carriers.
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet (Boeing, US)
Highly upgraded version of the F/A-18 AD Hornet, enlarged and given new engines and avionics. Commonality between the Hornet and Super Hornet is only about 25%. Strengths include its powerful AN/APG-79 AESA radar, which has drawn significant interest from India. This radar could allow Super Hornets to play a unique role in India’s fighter fleet as versatile “quarterbacks” (or better yet, “cricket captains”) due to their radar’s performance and information sharing abilities. Other advantages include carrier capability, a very wide range of integrated weapons, a design that is proven in service and in combat, F414 engines that may also serve as the base for LCA Tejas Mk2; and complete assurance in its future upgrade spiral, given the US Navy’s commitment to it.
Weaknesses of the Super Hornet platform included deep distrust of America’s reliability as an arms supplier, technology transfer concerns, and the aircraft’s expense. Given the costs to other customers so far, it seems unlikely that Boeing can deliver 126 fully-equipped F/A-18 E/F Block II aircraft for just $10.2 billion, let alone aircraft plus lifetime support. The Super Hornet also offers poorer aerodynamic performance than the Eurofighter or Rafale, due to inherent airframe limitations. Finally, it’s a new aircraft type for the IAF, so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed from the ground up.
F-16 Fighting Falcon (Lockheed Martin, US)
Lockheed’s “Block 70” offering would have been a modified version of the F-16E Block 60 “Desert Falcon”, currently serving with the UAE. Strengths include the widest multi-role capability among lightweight fighters; its proven AN/APG-80 AESA radar; the addition of integrated IRST (Infra Red Search & Track) capability; the widest choice of proven avionics and weapon systems; a long record of proven service so all issues are known; and widespread compatibility with potential allies in Asia and the Middle East who also fly F-16s. The combination of an AESA radar on a less expensive platform is also good news for cruise missile defence efforts, if that’s considered a priority.
Weaknesses include the fact that Pakistan also flies F-16s; the fact it’s a new aircraft type, so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; and Lockheed Martin’s difficulty in complying with industrial offset provisions, given their lack of penetration in India. The MMRCA RFP’s delays may have helped Lockheed, by allowing them ample time to find arrangements with Indian firms. There are also reports that the US government was pushing this option, because of the regional reassurance factor. While an F-16 E/F Block 60+ would have a number of important advantages over Pakistan’s F-16 A/Bs and even its new Block 50/52 aircraft, the common underlying aircraft type would probably take some of the edge off the deal from Pakistan’s point of view.
MiG-29OVT, became the MiG-35 (Roson boron export, Russia)
This modified MiG-29 includes improved radar and avionics that give it multi-role capability, extra fuel in a new aircraft “spine,” and thrust-vectoring engines a la India’s Su-30 MKIs. While the MiG-29 has traditionally been considered a lightweight fighter, the combined effect of these changes pushes the MiG-29 toward the mid range.
Its strengths include compatibility with India’s existing and future MiG-29 fleet, and its ability to carry advanced Russian missiles already in service: the revolutionary AA-11/R-73 Archer and longer range AA-12/R-77 “AMRAAMski.” The presence of MiG-29-related manufacturing and maintenance, including a new plant for licence-building RD-33 Series III engines in India, would make compliance with industrial offset requirements easier.
The MiG-29’s biggest weaknesses are short range, engines that produce telltale smoke (very bad in air combat) and lack of true multi-role capability. The MiG-35 largely fixes these issues, and may even add an AESA radar of its own if Phazotron-NIIR can have its new Zhuk-AE ready in time. Remaining weaknesses in the MiG-35 bid include the serious difficulties India has had with Russian firms over the refit of its new carrier, order for more Mi-17 helicopters, and order for three more Krivak-III class frigates. All have featured failure to deliver, and post-contract price renegotiation demands that have raised prices up 200%. Reports that MiG-35 delivery cannot start before 2014 at the earliest add a further disadvantage, especially compared to competitors with active production lines and rapid delivery capability.
JAS-39 Gripen (Saab, Sweden)
The Gripen is a true 4th+ generation lightweight fighter and significantly more capable than category competitors like the F-16 and Mirage 2000, though the MiG-35 may give it a run for its money. Gripen NG begins to address the aircraft’s range limitations, and would include an AESA radar among its other enhancements. Other strengths include a wide choice of integrated weapons and pods; reasonable purchase cost; the fact that it has been designed for exceptional cost of ownership; and the ability to operate from roads instead of runways if necessary. With respect to industrial offsets, Saab has made a strong offer, backed by excellent record in countries like South Africa, Hungary, the Czech Republic et al. As an interesting side note, the JAS- 39NG’s use of GE’s F414G engine would create future commonality with India’s own Tejas Mk2, which will also be powered by the F414 after DRDO’s Kaveri engine failure put the entire project in jeopardy.
The JAS-39’s drawbacks include its short range; the fact it’s a new aircraft type for the IAF; its AESA radar’s developmental status; perceived similarity (whether valid or not) to the Tejas fighter’s potential performance; and a low volume of international orders to date that raises questions about the platform’s ability to modernize over the next 30-40 years.
(With inputs from Defense Industry Daily)
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