COVER STORY | AIR POWER
fighting capabilities | air commodore jasjit singh
God is on the side of bigger batallions
The way out of the adverse air balance is to acquire combat aircraft swiftly and make up for earlier mental blocks in South Block
MORE than two decades ago, China publicly acknowledged that the Indian Armed Forces were among the best in the world. There was a clear respect and even a touch of envy in those words because China’s military was nowhere close to Indian military capability. China, the PLA and the Chinese Air Force had hardly recovered from the effects and after-effects of the Cultural Revolution. The links with the US military had started but became a victim of the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989. With that, China’s hopes of modernization of its armed forces were also dashed. It sought closer ties with India and showed keenness to establish military to-military relations. That was then. And that was the period when – though heavily criticized at home – the IAF’s modernization reached its peak for the first and last time.
The modernization began its downslide two decades ago. The AOC-in-C, Western Air Command, the premier operational command, and others started to caution against the expected drop in force level if modernization was not restored. This author had strongly and frequently argued for re-opening the manufacturing line of the MiG-21 and upgrading it. About 125 aircraft were finally upgraded nearly a decade later. But there was no modernization and even when it was partially restored it would not keep the force level up to strength even though the Russians came to our rescue and extended the design life of the MiGs, providing a reprieve from force levels dropping in the 1990s. The LCA, which was to have replaced the MiG-21 by the end of the 1980s, was nowhere in sight and the first aircraft under the fancy title of Initial Operational Capability has been handed over to the IAF very recently. It will take at least another year before a squadron is established and even then one wonders how much of the weapons would have been integrated and cleared for operational use.
We are manufacturing the Su-30MKI at HAL, Nashik, but its output has been far less than the mandatory life-end retirement of frontline aircraft. The effect of all this and more has been an unplanned deleteriously rapid drop in the combat force level of the IAF. By publicly known data, the combat force level has shrunk by nearly 40% of the authorised levels.
This would mean that, on the Pakistan front, the IAF will have less combat squadrons than the Pakistan Air Force even if it maintains a mere eight squadrons on the China front! It is not as if we did not have the money or foreign exchange. Both were available and budgeted but nearly Rs 50,000 crore were surrendered unspent during BJP rule, probably because of the “Bofors Syndrome”. This made a mockery of “India Shining” and the high economic growth rates. If the government had spent even a quarter of the sum returned to the exchequer, there would have been no shortfall in the combat force level today.
But the story does not end there. Defence Minister AK Antony informed Parliament last year that the IAF is short of 600 pilots. He said “pilots” and not officers, implying that the shortage is at the operational level. As it is, shortage in the higher ranks can actually be welcomed so that a larger number can be promoted against existing vacancies and not against hypothetical figures of “cadre reviews” which are not based on responsibility, authority and accountability. The actual number of pilots required will keep going up since the Su-30MKI, of which over 300 will be in service, require two pilots per aircraft. Also, the 250-300 Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter is designed for two pilots per aircraft, not counting the non-effectiveness due to a number of reasons. These shortages have occurred not so much because there are not enough recruits, but because sufficient flying training establishments and aircraft have not been created over the decades. Even now, the primary trainer is no longer available to provide the foundations of a service pilot.
THIS provides a grim picture of the IAF and its combat capability. But there is another side to the picture – and that concerns the quality of training. The IAF’s fighting capabilities are among the best of the leading air forces of the world. The culture of the Air Force is such that few can survive in flying assignments unless they are professionally very competent. At the same time, the best of them undergo one or both of the two courses – the Fighter Combat Leader course (FCL) at Tactics and Combat Development Establishment, and the Qualified Flying Instructor course at FIS (Flying Instructors School) which hone flying skills to higher levels of professional competence.In every war that India has fought, the IAF and its aircrew (fighter and transporter/helicopter) and ground crew – all now termed air warriors – have demonstrated exceptional professional ability and initiative.
In 1965, Pakistan launched surprise air attacks and managed to destroy a large number of IAF aircraft on the ground. The IAF was in the middle of reorganization and expansion, equipped largely with low technology and even semi-obsolete aircraft. It tackled the far superior PAF, then equipped with high technology aircraft and radars supplied by the US, rapidly pushing it on the defensive and literally out of the war in a few days. The PAF, a pretty professional air force with state-of-the-art weapons and aircraft, cried out for help and President Ayub Khan flew a secret mission to Beijing at night to seek assistance. And China obliged, even offering a couple of nuclear warheads! Overall, in the 23-day war, the PAF was losing three aircraft to one of the IAF in air warfare.
In 1971, the IAF hit back at the ambitious line-up of “Tikka Offensive”, aimed to break through the Indian defences in the west. But while the Pakistani forces were assembling for the offensive, the IAF began knocking out Pakistani tanks. Pakistan was forced to abandon the offensive. Farther south, at Longewala, the IAF destroyed a regiment of tanks when a Pakistani Division tried a clandestine offensive into India. Many more examples can be cited, and the past gives us a degree of confidence for the future.
But a lot of water has flowed down the Ganga. The IAF’s greatest handicap now would be the adverse airpower balance in the coming 10-15 years. This means that the current force will have to do more, especially if there is coordination in a potential conflict with China and/or Pakistan, or both. But the air exercises held with the air forces of various developed countries, especially the US, have consistently proved that the IAF can hold its own against the best in the world. Extensive studies are being undertaken in the West to understand how the IAF manages to achieve such dramatic results. (The MiG- 21 taking a camera shot of the frontline USAF F-15 fighter after getting behind it in a mock air combat exercise is still the talk of the crew rooms and training establishments in the West, probably as much due to the skill of IAF pilots as to injured pride!) Consequently, more countries are seeking air exercises with the IAF to train their air forces.
Thus, the capability for air dominance is undeniable. The problem is the quantitative balance against the IAF. Even in the days of high technology aerospace warfare, Napoleon’s dictum that God marches with the biggest battalions remains valid. More robust decision making to fill the void of depleted force levels would enormously help to avoid the fighting people having to bear the cost of errors of the planning people.
fighting capabilities | air commodore jasjit singh
God is on the side of bigger batallions
The way out of the adverse air balance is to acquire combat aircraft swiftly and make up for earlier mental blocks in South Block
MORE than two decades ago, China publicly acknowledged that the Indian Armed Forces were among the best in the world. There was a clear respect and even a touch of envy in those words because China’s military was nowhere close to Indian military capability. China, the PLA and the Chinese Air Force had hardly recovered from the effects and after-effects of the Cultural Revolution. The links with the US military had started but became a victim of the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989. With that, China’s hopes of modernization of its armed forces were also dashed. It sought closer ties with India and showed keenness to establish military to-military relations. That was then. And that was the period when – though heavily criticized at home – the IAF’s modernization reached its peak for the first and last time.The modernization began its downslide two decades ago. The AOC-in-C, Western Air Command, the premier operational command, and others started to caution against the expected drop in force level if modernization was not restored. This author had strongly and frequently argued for re-opening the manufacturing line of the MiG-21 and upgrading it. About 125 aircraft were finally upgraded nearly a decade later. But there was no modernization and even when it was partially restored it would not keep the force level up to strength even though the Russians came to our rescue and extended the design life of the MiGs, providing a reprieve from force levels dropping in the 1990s. The LCA, which was to have replaced the MiG-21 by the end of the 1980s, was nowhere in sight and the first aircraft under the fancy title of Initial Operational Capability has been handed over to the IAF very recently. It will take at least another year before a squadron is established and even then one wonders how much of the weapons would have been integrated and cleared for operational use.
We are manufacturing the Su-30MKI at HAL, Nashik, but its output has been far less than the mandatory life-end retirement of frontline aircraft. The effect of all this and more has been an unplanned deleteriously rapid drop in the combat force level of the IAF. By publicly known data, the combat force level has shrunk by nearly 40% of the authorised levels.
I had frequently argued for re-opening the manufacturing line of the MiG-21 and upgrading it. About 125 aircraft were upgraded a decade later.
This would mean that, on the Pakistan front, the IAF will have less combat squadrons than the Pakistan Air Force even if it maintains a mere eight squadrons on the China front! It is not as if we did not have the money or foreign exchange. Both were available and budgeted but nearly Rs 50,000 crore were surrendered unspent during BJP rule, probably because of the “Bofors Syndrome”. This made a mockery of “India Shining” and the high economic growth rates. If the government had spent even a quarter of the sum returned to the exchequer, there would have been no shortfall in the combat force level today. But the story does not end there. Defence Minister AK Antony informed Parliament last year that the IAF is short of 600 pilots. He said “pilots” and not officers, implying that the shortage is at the operational level. As it is, shortage in the higher ranks can actually be welcomed so that a larger number can be promoted against existing vacancies and not against hypothetical figures of “cadre reviews” which are not based on responsibility, authority and accountability. The actual number of pilots required will keep going up since the Su-30MKI, of which over 300 will be in service, require two pilots per aircraft. Also, the 250-300 Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter is designed for two pilots per aircraft, not counting the non-effectiveness due to a number of reasons. These shortages have occurred not so much because there are not enough recruits, but because sufficient flying training establishments and aircraft have not been created over the decades. Even now, the primary trainer is no longer available to provide the foundations of a service pilot.
On the Pakistan front, the IAF will have less combat squadrons than the PAF even if it maintains a mere eight squadrons on the China front!
THIS provides a grim picture of the IAF and its combat capability. But there is another side to the picture – and that concerns the quality of training. The IAF’s fighting capabilities are among the best of the leading air forces of the world. The culture of the Air Force is such that few can survive in flying assignments unless they are professionally very competent. At the same time, the best of them undergo one or both of the two courses – the Fighter Combat Leader course (FCL) at Tactics and Combat Development Establishment, and the Qualified Flying Instructor course at FIS (Flying Instructors School) which hone flying skills to higher levels of professional competence.In every war that India has fought, the IAF and its aircrew (fighter and transporter/helicopter) and ground crew – all now termed air warriors – have demonstrated exceptional professional ability and initiative.
In a Nutshell
THE obvious solution to redress the adverse air power balance is to acquire combat aircraft on high priority and make up for the earlier lack of decisionmaking in South Block. The IAF has been waiting for an MMRCA since 2001. The RFP was issued only in 2007, a good three years after the decline in the force level began. The IAF’s evaluation of all six aircraft in the run was complete last year and further action is now up to South Block. But there is a long process ahead. We will be fortunate if the first squadron is equipped by 2015 at the earliest and the total supplies of 126 aircraft are delivered in the following decade. By that time, most of the MiG-21s and some of the MiG-27s would have finished their design life.
THE obvious solution to redress the adverse air power balance is to acquire combat aircraft on high priority and make up for the earlier lack of decisionmaking in South Block. The IAF has been waiting for an MMRCA since 2001. The RFP was issued only in 2007, a good three years after the decline in the force level began. The IAF’s evaluation of all six aircraft in the run was complete last year and further action is now up to South Block. But there is a long process ahead. We will be fortunate if the first squadron is equipped by 2015 at the earliest and the total supplies of 126 aircraft are delivered in the following decade. By that time, most of the MiG-21s and some of the MiG-27s would have finished their design life.
In 1965, Pakistan launched surprise air attacks and managed to destroy a large number of IAF aircraft on the ground. The IAF was in the middle of reorganization and expansion, equipped largely with low technology and even semi-obsolete aircraft. It tackled the far superior PAF, then equipped with high technology aircraft and radars supplied by the US, rapidly pushing it on the defensive and literally out of the war in a few days. The PAF, a pretty professional air force with state-of-the-art weapons and aircraft, cried out for help and President Ayub Khan flew a secret mission to Beijing at night to seek assistance. And China obliged, even offering a couple of nuclear warheads! Overall, in the 23-day war, the PAF was losing three aircraft to one of the IAF in air warfare.
In 1971, the IAF hit back at the ambitious line-up of “Tikka Offensive”, aimed to break through the Indian defences in the west. But while the Pakistani forces were assembling for the offensive, the IAF began knocking out Pakistani tanks. Pakistan was forced to abandon the offensive. Farther south, at Longewala, the IAF destroyed a regiment of tanks when a Pakistani Division tried a clandestine offensive into India. Many more examples can be cited, and the past gives us a degree of confidence for the future.
Exercises held with the air forces of various developed countries have consistently proved that the IAF can hold its own against the best in the world.
But a lot of water has flowed down the Ganga. The IAF’s greatest handicap now would be the adverse airpower balance in the coming 10-15 years. This means that the current force will have to do more, especially if there is coordination in a potential conflict with China and/or Pakistan, or both. But the air exercises held with the air forces of various developed countries, especially the US, have consistently proved that the IAF can hold its own against the best in the world. Extensive studies are being undertaken in the West to understand how the IAF manages to achieve such dramatic results. (The MiG- 21 taking a camera shot of the frontline USAF F-15 fighter after getting behind it in a mock air combat exercise is still the talk of the crew rooms and training establishments in the West, probably as much due to the skill of IAF pilots as to injured pride!) Consequently, more countries are seeking air exercises with the IAF to train their air forces.
Thus, the capability for air dominance is undeniable. The problem is the quantitative balance against the IAF. Even in the days of high technology aerospace warfare, Napoleon’s dictum that God marches with the biggest battalions remains valid. More robust decision making to fill the void of depleted force levels would enormously help to avoid the fighting people having to bear the cost of errors of the planning people.
IN the armed forces, dereliction of duty is an offence that could result in a court martial which in turn leads to dismissal in peacetime and a death sentence during war. Apparently, no such retribution is available in our democracy where ruling parties and coalitions can be apathetic and negligent about rising threats across our borders and get away by paying lip service to national security through clever rhetoric. India has an army that is desperate to modernize its artillery, a navy that needs ships and an air force whose combat capability is shrinking. Yet, proposals and needs stated by the armed forces mostly languish in a procedural maze concocted in the name of “transparency in defence deals”.
In sharp contrast, China has a clear and time-bound plan and there are obvious indications that implementation is on in full. It laid down a three-step developmental strategy (see box). Its plan to “lay a solid foundation by 2010” appears to have been achieved, as demonstrated by the large-scale exercise, Stride-2009, held to coincide with the celebration of 50 years of communist rule. Fifty thousand troops were moved from western China to a region in the eastern part. The objective of Stride-2009 was to test the ability to move forces on a large scale from the areas they had trained in to areas they were unfamiliar with. Another aim was to subject the massive rail, road and air infrastructure created over the years to heavy military movement pressure and examine if such pressure adversely affected civilian population. The US Navy’s huge flotilla, sailing in Korean waters as a show of strength, was recently unnerved and shocked when a Chinese submarine surfaced right in its midst, displaying sophisticated stealth capabilities.
THE IAF has upgraded the MiG-21 Bisons and has plans to upgrade the MiG-29s and Mirage-2000s. But upgrades have limitations and generational improvements are difficult to incorporate in older aircraft. India and Russia are jointly producing a fifth generation fighter but there will be a time lag before it can be inducted into the IAF and become operational. The 126 aircraft deal being finalized will also take time to become operational. Basic flying training needs urgent attention. The DRDO has promised much but delivered little. They must jettison their bureaucratic approach and adopt a professional and result-oriented attitude to make any significant impact on military capability.
Unfortunately, the primary cause of the under-subscription is of the services’ own making. Till the 1980s, NDA enjoyed the “first pick advantage” and attracted the brightest youths. As Class X was the minimum qualification for entry to the NDA and the age group was 15-17 years, entry into the Academy was the first career option available. Understandably, parents encouraged their sons to sit for the NDA examination and be settled in a career at the earliest. As no other career option was available at that stage, most bright boys considered it prudent to give the NDA a try.
The events of the past few years have proved their apprehensions to be prophetic. The JCOs foresaw what the top brass failed to. Instead of earning kudos for giving women a chance, the services are getting flak from the judiciary, media and self-appointed experts. Demands are being made to grant permanent commission to women in the combat arms, a demand that is unprecedented in any army. Worse, some have gone to the ridiculous extent of demanding all-women battalions. A matter that critically affects the health of the services has been belittled as one of “equality of sexes”.
THE Indian security agencies’ successful handling of a series of events involving lucrative terrorist targets in the last quarter of 2010 showed they are succeeding in setting right their woeful performance during the 26/11 attack in Mumbai two years ago. The tasks faced by them would have been daunting for even the security agencies of the global powers.
However, the biggest chink in national security is in coastal security. No doubt it is a complex issue mired in the roundrobin power games played by diverse Ministries. Apart from the State governments, at the Centre also it involves coordinating the functioning of many agencies and Ministries, including defence, ports and shipping, fisheries, agriculture, off-shore drilling, maritime trade, environmental protection and international relations. So it is not surprising the Union Home Ministry took two years to embark on forming a multidimensional command structure. Four Joint Operation Centres have been set up under the respective naval commanders-in-chief. A Sagar Prahari Bal under the Navy has been set up to patrol shallow waters off the coast. A thousand sailors equipped with 80 fast interceptor boats are being trained in phases. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for coastal security have been finalized with respect to all coastal States and Union Territories.
They are fooling the poor adivasis with false promises of fighting for their cause against the government. They have their own land, forest and mining mafias. The government’s mistake is that it has not talked directly with the adivasis. For the adivasis, “government” represents BSF and CRPF jawans with guns chasing them. They have never known any health centre, post office, school or any other infrastructure or civic amenity. The Communists have taken full advantage of the situation.
Insurgency is still on in Manipur and Assam. It has become a way of life. Government servants in Manipur, Nagaland and Assam have to pay 10 percent of their salaries to insurgents. Even contractors and industrialists are not spared. People are fed up. All that the Prime Minister does when he visits the Northeast is announce packages. All these packages end up in the pockets of the insurgents. In the army we have always opposed these packages.
For the common man, onions have always been tear-jerkers. When they are available in plenty, they bring on tears while chopping and slicing. When they are in short supply or being sold at exorbitant rates, they bring tears to people’s eyes for obvious reasons. As to why we are so obsessed with this all-season tearjerker defies explanation.
The affair began some months ago when the United Progressive Alliance could not achieve consensus on the CVC’s appointment. The swearing-in of IAS officer Polayil Joseph Thomas (1973, Kerala cadre) as CVC in the President of India’s office on September 7, 2010, kicked up a storm. The leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, Sushma Swaraj, boycotted the ceremony. As a member of the statutory committee that appointed the CVC (the other two members are the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, as provided for in the CVC Act, 2003), she had opposed Thomas’ candidature because he is a co-accused in the 19-year-old palmolein import case that led to loss of Rs 2.8-crore revenue for the Kerala exchequer.
He is the eighth accused in the charge-sheet framed by Kerala’s Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau with the first and prime accused being former Chief Minister K Karunakaran. The latter had managed to delay the judicial process by securing stays from the Supreme Court. After his death on December 23, 2010, the Supreme Court disposed of his appeal against the State government’s move to revive prosecution in the palmolein scam. With this, the way is clear for framing of charges against the accused in a trial court in Kerala. In addition to Karunakaran’s delaying tactics, the State government also shifted stands due to political factors. 




